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We demonstrate the decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) with one-way quantum com-
munication in polarization space over 75 km. So far, our experimental implementation is the only
one that really offers the unconditionally secure final keys among all the implementations of long-
distance QKD with weak coherent states. We use 3 different intensities of 0, 0.2 and 0.6 for the
pulses of source in our experiment. In order to eliminate the influences of polarization mode disper-
sion in the long-distance single-mode optical fiber, an automatic polarization compensation system
is utilized to implement the active compensation. Only one detector is used in our experiment. The
secure distance can be raised to 120 km given 4 detectors.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution [1, 2, 3] can in principle
offer the unconditional secure private communications
between two remote parties, Alice and Bob. However,
the security proofs for the ideal BB84 protocol [4, 5] do
not guarantee the security of a specific set-up in prac-
tice due to various imperfections there. One important
problem in practical QKD is the effects of the imper-
fect source, say, the coherent states. The decoy state
method [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] can help to generate the uncondi-
tional final keys even an imperfect source is used by Alice
in practical QKD. Basically, QKD can be realized in both
free space and optical fiber [2]. Each option has its own
advantages. The fiber QKD can be run in the always-on
mode: it runs in both day and night and is not affected
by the weather. Also, the future local QKD networks are
supposed to be using fiber. So far, there are many experi-
ments of fiber QKD with weak coherent lights [11]. How-
ever, these results actually do not offer the unconditional
security because of the possible photon-number-splitting
attack [12]. Recently, there are also experimental imple-
mentations with the decoy-state method for a distance
of 13 km and 60 km respectively [13]. However, these
implementations use two-way quantum communications
to which the decoy state method actually doesn’t apply:
even we use the decoy-state method here, the final keys
can be in principle insecure given the so-called Trojan
horse attacks [2].
Here we present the first decoy-state QKD implemen-
tation to which the decoy-state method really applies:
We implement it with only one-way quantum communi-
cation and our result is really unconditionally secure as
expected for the decoy-state method. For the uncondi-
tional security, we mean that the probability that Eve has
non-negligible amount of information about the final key
is exponentially close to 0, say, e−O(100). Also, we imple-
ment it for a sufficiently long distance (75 km) where the
decoy-state method is indeed necessary: Given the exist-
ing technologies [11], if the distance is shorter than about
20 km, through the simple worst-case estimation [14] of
the fraction of tagged bits, it is still possible for one to
implement the unconditionally secure QKD without us-
ing the decoy-state method.
We can know how to distill the secure final keys with
imperfect source given the separate theoretical results
from Ref. [14], if we know the upper bound of the fraction
of tagged bits (those raw bits generated by multi-photon
pulses from Alice) or equivalently, the lower bound of the
fraction of untagged bits (those raw bits generated by
single-photon pulses from Alice). In Wang’s 3-intensity
decoy-state theory [7, 8], one can randomly use 3 different
intensities (average photon numbers) of each pulses (0, µ,
µ′) in the protocol and then observe the counting rates
of pulses of each intensities, say S0, Sµ, Sµ′ . The density




















c) for the count-
ing rates of those vacuum pulses, single-photon pulses
and ρc pulses from ρµ(ρµ′ ). Asymptotically, the values
of primed symbols here should be equal to those values
of unprimed symbols. However, in an experiment the
number of samples is finite therefore they could be a bit
2different. The bound values of s1, s
′
1 can be determined
by the following joint constraints{
Sµ = e













c = (1 − 10√scNµ )sc, s
′
0 = 0
and s0 = (1+r0)S0 = (1+
10√
S0N0
)S0 to obtain the worst-
case results [7, 8] and Nµ, N0 are the pulse numbers of




The experimental setup is shown in Fig.1, mainly in-
cluding transmitter (Alice), quantum channel, receiver
(Bob) and electronics system. All the electronics mod-
ules are designed by ourselves. The synchrodyne (SD) is
designed by field programmable gate array (FPGA, Al-
tera Co.) and outputs multiple channels of synchronous
clocks with independent programmable parameter set-
tings, which is equivalent to an arbitrary function gener-
ator, to drive the modules of random number generator
(RNG), data acquisition (DAQ) and single-photon detec-
tor (SPD) respectively. Then the signals with repetition
frequency of f = 1.67 MHz and FWHM of about 1 ns are
generated by laser diode driver (LDD) to drive 10 DFB
laser diodes (LD) at the central wavelength of 1550 nm,
where 4 LDs are used for decoy states (µ) and another 4
LDs are used for signal states (µ′) and the other 2 LDs
are used for polarization calibration. The polarization
states of photons emitting from LDs can be transformed
to arbitrary polarization state by polarization controller
(PC). For decoy states and signal states, the four polar-
ization states are |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉, |−〉, where |H〉, |V 〉 rep-
resent horizontal polarization and vertical polarization,
|+〉 = 1/√2(|H〉 + |V 〉) and |−〉 = 1/√2(|H〉 − |V 〉), as
the four states for the standard BB84 protocol [1]. For
test states, the two polarization states are |H〉 and |+〉
to calibrate the two sets of polarization basis in Bob’s
side. Further the photons of every channel are coupled
to an optical fiber via fiber coupling network (FCN),
which is composed of multiple beam splitters (BS) and
polarization beam splitters (PBS) and optical attenua-
tors. In FCN, the fiber length of every channel must be
adjusted precisely so that the arrival time differences to
SPD caused by the fiber length differences can be less
than 100 ps.
However, the central wavelengths of every LD have
very slight variance. In the experiment, we insert a
DWDM fiber filter (FF) in Alice’s side. On the one hand,
it can guarantee that the wavelengths of emitted photons
in all channels are same to avoid the possibility of Eve’s
attack utilizing the variance of photon wavelengths. On
the other hand, it can reduce the influences of chromatic
dispersion in long-distance fiber.
In Wang’s decoy-state protocol [7, 8], 3 different inten-






























FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the experimental setup. Solid
line and dashed line represent optical fiber and electric cable
respectively. PC, polarization controller; FCN, fiber coupling
network; FF, fiber filter; BS, beam splitter; TP, test point;
SMF, single-mode fiber; DL, delay line; EPC, electric polar-
ization controller; PBS, polarization beam splitter; OS, op-
tical switch; SPD, single-photon detector; LDD, laser diode
driver; RNG, random number generator; SD, synchrodyne;
DAC, digital-to-analog converter; HVA, high voltage ampli-
fier; DAQ, data acquisition; USB, universal serial bus.
states and vacuum are used. According to the simulation
of experimental parameters, the pulse numbers ratio of
these 3 intensities is 5 : 4 : 1. And the intensities of
signal states and decoy states are fixed at µ′ = 0.6 and
µ = 0.2 respectively. The fluctuations of the intensities
are monitored at the test point (TP).
After passing through the long-distance single-mode
fiber (SMF, Corning Co.), at Bob’s side we adopt one-
detector state analysis scheme combining the advantages
of time-division measurement and optical switch (OS,
Primanex Co.), not the standard four-detector scheme
for BB84 protocol [1]. Firstly a fiber BS is used to select
the two polarization measurement basis called HV basis
and +− basis randomly. An additional fiber delay line
(DL) of 190.4 m is inserted in +− basis to separate the
two basis in time. Furthermore, the synchronous clock
as the trigger of SPD (3.34 MHz) can discriminate the
two basis exactly. This creative time-division measure-
ment scheme makes the state analysis of BB84 protocol
simpler. However, it also induces additional loss of about
4.8 dB comparison to the four-detector scheme. Secondly
due to the polarization mode dispersion (PMD) effects
in long-distance SMF, we develop an automatic polariza-
tion compensation (APC) system to compensate for the
PMD actively. The principles of APC are: Alice sends
fixed |H〉 states or |+〉 states. Then Bob records the
accepted counting rates in the corresponding basis us-
ing data acquisition (DAQ, designed by FPGA) system
and transmits them to the computer via universal serial
bus (USB). After algorithmic processing, the computer
gives out the data, which can be converted to voltages of
electric polarization controllers (EPC, General Photon-
ics Co.) through digital-to-analog converter (DAC) and
high voltage amplifier (HVA). Then the fiber squeezers in
EPC are driven by the voltages and change the polariza-







































FIG. 2: a) Test of the automatic polarization compensation
(APC) system with 75 km optical fiber. In position 1 and
2 the APC system monitors the visibility changes of polar-
ization states and adjusts the voltages of EPC actively to
reach the target visibility. Subsequently, the visibility of po-
larization states become worse slowly when free running. In
position 3, artificial disturbance induces the drastic change of
visibility and the APC system can still work well. b) Compar-
ison of the final key generation rate of signal states per pulse
between the theoretical calculation and experimental results
with different distance settings. The three fiber lengths are
13.448 km, 50.524 km, and 75.774 km respectively.
tion [15]. After repeating feedback controls the visibility
of test states at Bob’s side can reach the target value and
the APC system stops. When the visibility is degraded
to below the threshold value the APC system will restart.
The average adjusting time is about 3 minutes. Figure
2(a) shows the test results of the APC system in the case
of 75 km optical fiber. Thirdly we use a magnetic OS
driven by another RNG module, whose switching time is
less than 20 µs to implement random switch between the
two output ports of PBS. The maximum repetition fre-
quency of the OS is about 5 kHz, which is more than the
arrived photons number at PBS’s input port. And only
one count at most is recorded in every switching status
of the OS to guarantee the security.
We use this all-fiber quantum cryptosystem to im-
plement the experimental demonstration of 3-intensity
decoy-state QKD over 75 km using polarization encod-
ing. The experimental parameters and their correspond-
ing values are listed in Table I. In the experiment, Alice
totally transmits about N = 5.15 G pulses to Bob during
the time of about 51.5 minutes. Therefore we can obtain
enough sample numbers to verify the theory and reduce
the statistical fluctuations. After the transmission Bob
announces the pulse sequence numbers and basis infor-
mation of received states. Then Alice broadcasts to Bob
the actual state information (decoy states or signal states
or vacuum) and basis information of the corresponding
pulses. According to the experimental results Alice and
Bob can calculate the parameters of Sµ′ , Sµ, S0, Eµ′ and
Eµ, where Eµ′ and Eµ are the experimental observed
quantum bit error rate (QBER) values of signal states
and decoy states respectively.
Further, we can numerically calculate a tight lower
bound of the counting rate of single-photon using the
Eqs. 2. The calculation result, s′1, is shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Experimental parameters and their corresponding
values of 75 km decoy-state QKD.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
fiber length 75.774 km ηD ≈ 9%
f 1.67 MHz N 5.15 G
µ′ 0.6 µ 0.2
Sµ′ 1.378 × 10
−4 Sµ 5.367 × 10
−5









4.891% Rµ′ 1.588 × 10
−5
Rµ 3.167 × 10
−6 RExp 13.303 Hz
RThe 21.622 Hz RExp/RThe 0.615
The next step is to estimate the fraction of single-photon
∆1 and the QBER upper bound of single-photon E1. In












to calculate the fraction of single-photon in signal states
and decoy states respectively [7, 8]. Then we can fur-
ther estimate the QBER upper bound of single-photon
in signal states and decoy states respectively, i.e.,
 E
µ′











Here we consider the statistical fluctuations of the vac-
uum states to obtain the worst-case results.
Lastly we can calculate the final key rates of signal












The final key rate of signal states in our experiment is
RExp = (5/10)fRµ′ = 13.303 Hz. Then We compare our
results with the theoretically allowed final key rate RThe,
i.e., in the case both ∆1 and E1 are known without any
overestimation. The theoretically allowed best values of
∆1 and E1 for signal states are{
∆µ
′












with the assumption that the ideal value of the single-
photon counting rate s1T = η + S0 and Sµ′ = ηµ
′ +
S0, where η is the overall transmittance including the
detection efficiency of the SPD ηD. We find out that our
experimental results are about 61.5% of the theoretically
allowed maximum value.































Vacuum Counting Rate of Decoy States
FIG. 3: The final key
rate of decoy pulses varies
with the vacuum count-
ing rate of s0. The unit of
horizontal axis is S0 (the
observed counting rate of
those vacuum pulses in
the experiment).
In our experiment, the raw bits caused by those decoy
pulses can also be used to generate the final keys. During
the above calculation, we have used the worst-case results
in every step for the security. Obviously, there are more
economic methods for the calculation of final key rate.
Consider the key rate calculation of decoy states above.
In calculating ∆µ1 , we assumed the worst case of s0 =
(1+r0)S0, while in estimating the QBER of single-photon
pulses Eµ1 , we assumed the worst case of s0 = (1− r0)S0.
Although we don’t exactly know the true value of s0,
there must be one fixed value for both calculations of
∆µ1 and E
µ
1 . Therefore we can also safely calculate the
final key rate in the following way: choose one possible








)/∆µ1 and then calculate the possible key rate.
We try all possible values of (1− r0)S0 ≤ s0 ≤ (1+ r0)S0
and then pick out the smallest value as the lower bound of
decoy states key rate. Figure 3 demonstrates the results
with all possible values of s0 in the case of 75 km. We
find that the smallest value there is almost twice of that
in Table I, therefore the key rate of decoy pulses is almost
40% of that of the signal pulses.
Also, we have tested the system with different fiber
lengths and compared the final key rates with the theo-
retically allowed maximum values, see Fig.2(b). The fig-
ure shows that all the experimental values are very close
to the theoretical values. The differences are mainly due
to the imperfect polarization compensation and the pos-
sible statistical fluctuation.
Our experiment has used only one detector to measure
all of the four states in BB84 protocol for the first time.
Besides various obvious advantages, this also has some
disadvantages. Most serious one is the transmission loss.
OS will cause 3 dB loss and its insertion loss is 1.1 dB.
The time-division measurement scheme will cause about
4.8 dB loss. So the additional loss of one-detector mea-
surement scheme is 8.9 dB in total, which is equivalent to
about 44.5 km SMF loss. Therefore, if we use the stan-
dard four-detector measurement scheme (given that all
the parameters of SPDs are same) the final key rate and
maximum secure distance will be improved enormously.
In fact, the APC technique used in our experiment will
help to implement QKD in practice for a distance of
120 km in the future, given 4 detectors with the same
quality. Also, the efficiency of our detector is limited
and the dark counts here are non-negligible. Hopefully,
a low-noise and high-efficiency detector at telecommu-
nication wavelengths can be used in the future to fur-
ther improve the final key rate. The superconducting
transition-edge sensor is one of the promising candidates
in the future [16]. We believe that even with the existing
technologies today, the detection quality in our experi-
ment can be improved.
In summary, we have implemented the polarization-
based decoy-state QKD with one-way quantum commu-
nication. So far, our implementation is the only one that
really offers the unconditionally secure final keys among
all the implementations of long-distance QKD with weak
coherent states.
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